After a year that began
in lockdown for most, 2021 saw the onset of a number of deadly, violent
conflicts. Many of these were unpredicted, and, in a number of ways, 2021
perhaps should be considered as ‘the year of the coup’. In fact, Myanmar, Mali,
Guinea, and Sudan underwent a metavoli politeia by coup d’état, to use the
language of Plato, and attempts were made in Armenia, Nigeria and Jordan.[1] As predicted, Afghanistan
descended into chaos with the Taliban’s ascent, following the withdrawal of
NATO troops, fighting in The Sahel and The Maghreb intensified with the twin
threats of Islamic terrorism and climate change, and the humanitarian crisis in
Yemen reached a magnitude not thought possible in the twenty-first century. Indeed,
it seems that Mary Kaldor’s assertion that twenty-first century conflict would come
to be defined by their character as so-called ‘New Wars’ was prophetic; these
being wars which:
“Involve a blurring of the distinctions
between war (usually defined as violence between states or organized political
groups for political motives), organized crime (violence undertaken by
privately organized groups for private purposes, usually financial gain) and
large-scale violations of human rights (violence undertaken by states or
politically organized groups against individuals).”[2]
2022 may, however, with
luck, be a brighter and more peaceful year. As we will see, battle deaths declined
in the last recorded year and the number of major wars has descended from a contemporary
high. Nonetheless, there are a number of concerns for major conflict. Russia and
Belarus appear to be aggressively amassing on the Ukrainian border, somewhat reminiscent
of the conflict that began in 2014, leading to the Russian annexation of Crimea
and a halt on discussion concerning the eastwards expansion of NATO, a chief
Russian foreign policy goal.[3] Currently, exercises on
the border seem to have led to a number of NATO states reacting by placing
troops in the region, mobilising air and naval forces, and arming the Ukrainians
with better weaponry, so to increasingly limit any potential asymmetry in
military capability. This seems to be dragging the region into what John Herz
described as a ‘Security Dilemma’. In his ‘Theory of International Politics’,
the arch-theorist of balance and security, Kenneth Waltz, describes this
phenomenon as:
“A condition in which states,
unsure of one another’s' intentions, arm for the sake of security and in doing
so set a vicious circle in motion. Having armed for the sake of security,
states feel less secure and buy more arms because the means to anyone's
security is a threat to someone else who in turn responds by arming. Whatever
the weaponry and however many states in the system, states have to live with
their security dilemma, which is produced not by their wills but by their situations.
A dilemma cannot be solved; it can more or less readily be dealt with.”[4]
Undeniably, with heads
of state and foreign ministers heading to and from The Kremlin or Kyiv, it is
precisely such an attempt to ‘more or less’ readily deal with the problem that
diplomatic efforts are currently geared towards achieving. Nevertheless, such
efforts can always collapse and the dilemma intensified.
Equally, alongside this, other major powers
are experiencing a period of mutual-tension. Pressures are rising amidst the resuscitation
of Iranian nuclear limitations. Iranian ‘breakout time’ – the period it would
take to enrich enough fissile material for a nuclear weapon – has shrunk from
12 months, its level in 2016, to between three and six weeks, implying that a
new Iranian nuclear agreement needs to be conceived, but perhaps with Iran thus
holding more cards than in the past.[5] Incursions of warplanes into
Taiwanese airspace increased in 2021, with President Xi Jingping affirming that
‘reunification’ with Taiwan was a necessity policy aspiration to fulfil.[6] Adding to this, the new trilateral
naval security pact between Australia, the US and the UK, ‘AUKUS’, which
centres on the provision of Australia with nuclear powered submarines, holds
the capability to be seen by China as a challenge within its sphere of
influence in the Pacific. Hence, we can say without a doubt that Great Power
politics, and the potential for conflict that arises with such an unstable
condition of structural multipolarity, is back on the table for 2022.
The purpose of this investigation
will be to shine a light on five of the conflicts that may emerge in 2022 but do
not necessarily involve the major powers, having greater regional impact. A
number of publications and journalistic outfits will be currently recording and
tracing the events in Ukraine, Iran and China. Therefore, in light of this, in
this investigation I wish to shed some light on five lesser discussed cases in
which conflict may either breakout or be intensified over the course of the
coming year. In order to do this, we will first ground such a dialogue by assessing
the annual changes in the data collected by the Upsala Conflict Data Programme
and the UN High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR). From here our five cases
will be engaged with, beginning with Myanmar, before centring focus on
Ethiopia, Afghanistan, Haiti and Venezuela, prior to some concluding thoughts.
Global Trends
Before an increasingly
microscopic focus on but a number of cases can be investigated, it is well
worth engaging with the annual changes observable in the data collected by the
Uppsala Conflict Data Programme (UCDP). The
data discussed here does not pertain to 2021, but to 2020 – requiring some time
to collect, formulate and analyse thoroughly. Nonetheless, the general trends
that are presented here provide the context for the state of conflict in the
world at the beginning of the last year, and are as up to date as such
statistics can be. From the current data concerning global conflict trends
provided by the UCDP and other institutions[7], we can see that:
·
The
number of annual fatalities has risen from its 2019 level to over 80,000 deaths
in conflict zones worldwide. This has broken a contemporary trend of steady
decline with each passing year since 2014, recording 144,700. This is still
lower than the recorded level for 2018 however.
· As
far as state-based conflict is concerned, the number of armed active interstate,
intrastate and internationalised intrastate conflicts increased globally, surpassing
the previous high of 2016, with now almost as many internationalised as
non-internationalised intrastate conflicts.
· The
number of state-based armed conflicts (of any kind) has increased the most in
Africa, whilst falling or plateauing elsewhere.
· The
number of armed conflicts and dyads have increased, with more of the latter
than the former remaining consistent.
· The
total number of global battle deaths has decreased, to 50,000, but with slight
increases in Europe and Africa. In spite of this, the number of fatalities in
non-state conflicts has increased from 20,000, but not returned to the 2018
high for the period (1989-2020) of 25,000. To give some perspective of this
metric, in 2013 this data point was a quarter of its current level, just over
5,000.
·
Although
internationalised intrastate conflict battle-deaths have declined since 2019,
they still make the lions share, over 80%, of total battle deaths.
· The
number of non-state conflicts rose to 72, rising from 2019 but not returning to
the 2017 high of almost 90, with around 70% of these in Africa.
· The
number of fatalities from non-state conflicts increased by over three-thousand
to 23,100. The majority of these fatalities occurred in from Mexico, which witnessed
16,300 fatalities in non-state conflicts, some 71% of the global total.
·
The
UCDP found 39 belligerents engaging with one-sided violence in 2020, the
highest it has been since 2004. Fatalities in one-sided conflicts also
increased by 2,200 in 2020, to 7,700, with the number of governments forming
the key agent of such a conflict increasing but still remaining below the
number of non-state actors that can be defined as such in these conflicts.
· In
2022, 274 million people are in need of emergency humanitarian assistance – a 17%
increase on 2021.
·
As
of statistics from 2021, over 84 million individuals are forcibly displaced
globally.
Myanmar
On February 1st
2021, the Military of Myanmar (the Tatmadaw) led a coup against the recently
re-elected government of Aung Sang Suu Kyi’s National League for Democracy
(NLD). As of the 2020 November election, alongside claims that the NLD had
falsified the outcome, the military aligned nationalist Union Solidarity and
Development Party had lost 186 seats in the lower house and 117 seats in the
upper house of Myanmar’s legislature since 2015 – the last time they were in
power – triggering the coup. With the junta, Suu Kyi’s democratic
administration was removed, politicians detained, and the high-ranking general Min
Aung Hlaing installed as head of the government.
In Urban areas like Naypyidaw and Yangon, a
suppression of mostly peaceful protests by the Tatmadaw has fuelled broad-based
resistance in Myanmar, leading to action ranging from that of civil
disobedience to violent armed clashes with security forces. Indeed, one year on
to the day, the Assistance Association for Political Prisoners in Burma (AAPPB)
estimated that 1,507 had been killed by the military Junta, with 11,902
arrested or charged and 1,972 issued warrants.[8] This
being said, other organisations place an estimation of fatalities closer to 12,700
since the coup began.[9] These varying statistics demonstrate
not only Myanmar’s current condition of state-directed violence but the extent
to which citizens have been willing to resist in equal measure.
After the coup, overthrown
legislators founded their own state-wide authority, known as the National Unity
Government (NUG) and calling in September 2021 for a campaign of rebellion and
civil disobedience against the military regime. Since the forming of the NUG, sympathetic
resistance, collectively known as the People’s Defence Force (PDF), have attacked
both state government and military positions almost daily, engaging in a
programme of guerrilla tactics against those they see as either connected or
loyal to the military Junta.
Myanmar’s ethnic armed
groups, some of which are tens of thousands strong, have themselves adapted to
the crisis. What is equally important to grasp is that this coup occurred in
the wake of the Rohingya crisis. From 2015 onwards, the Tatmadaw engaged in a
period of sustained ethnic cleansing against the Muslim Rohingya minority in
Rakhine province, leading to a tidal wave of stateless refugees fleeing to
Bangladesh, whereby it is estimated that almost 900,000 Rohingya refugees
remained by August 2021.[10] Thus, running parallel to
political factors are ethnic tensions, further adding to the intensity and
magnitude of the conflict region by region. To illustrate this, the security
and humanitarian situation in northwest Myanmar has further deteriorated over
the course of the last quarter of 2021 due to intensified hostilities between
the Tatmadaw and the Chinland Defence Force (CDF) in Chin State. Equally, to
stress the widespread nature of the conflict in Myanmar, armed clashes have
intensified between the combined forces of the Tatmadaw and the Border Guard
Force, the allied forces of the Karen National Liberation Army (KNLA), the
Karen National Defence Organisation (KNDO), the Democratic Karen Benevolent
Army (DKBA) and the PDF in Kayin State, near the Myanmar-Thai border. The
conflict, we can hence state, is increasingly both regionalised and ethnicized,
adding only to its growing magnitude.
In rural areas, the
Tatmadaw fights these new resistance groups with older, perhaps antiquated,
counterinsurgency methods – known as the ‘four cuts’ strategy – denying food,
funding, intelligence, and recruits to the areas and movements that resist the
coup. In many regards, this has led to the targeting of civilians. For
instance, on the 24th December 2021 at least 35 people, including
four children and two staff of Save the Children, were killed in Kayah State,
prompting a damning response from the UN Security Council.[11] Such ‘counter-insurgency’
has also persuaded armed groups from engaging in formal alliances with the NUG,
naturally, publicly stating their intention for elections to be held in 2023
and the coup to be put down. Whether elections will come or not is another
story.
For the time being, the
people of Myanmar are struggling to secure their basic human needs. This
situation makes the likelihood of continual conflict greater as the economy falls
further into a downward spiral and as prices soar, but more significantly the
lack of government services or functioning infrastructure makes fulfilling human
needs like basic nutrition, medical attention, identity, security, recognition
and development increasingly less likely – and this is without mention of the
global COVID-19 pandemic, whereby restrictions and the limited availability of
cash or supplies pose key challenges for the humanitarian operations on the
ground. Shadowing the thought of the Conflict Resolution scholar John Burton, the
lack of accommodation afforded to such needs increases only the probability
that belligerents will either engage in a particular conflict, securing access
to basic needs; requiring rational institutional change and accommodation to
the satisfaction of such needs as a realistic requirement for the resolution of
the conflict, or even its stabilisation for that matter.[12]
So, what of the
situation currently in Myanmar, statistically speaking? In what way can we see
such needs being met? The following is an aggregation of
some of the most current data collected on the matter: [13]
· In
October 2021 alone, the World Food Programme (WFP) had to assist 599,900 people
in Myanmar, disseminating a total of 4,040 metric tonnes of food commodities.
· Almost
2.5 million Myanmarese people required aid in order to stave off some form of
malnutrition in 2021, according to the WFP.
·
A
71% jump in fuel prices has been recorded since the beginning of February 2021.
· More
than 2,200 houses and other civilian properties have reportedly either been
burnt down or destroyed in the time since the coup.
· 14.4
million people are considered by the United Nations Office for the Coordination
of Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA) to be of in humanitarian need, prioritizing 6.2
million as requiring urgent assistance due to mass food insecurity.
· During
the first ten months of 2021, 131 landmine incidents resulted in 76 deaths and
141 injuries countrywide, effecting both infrastructure and transportation
capabilities.
· A
total of 286 attacks on health care services were recorded across the country
between 1st February and 31st
December 2021. A total of 26 health workers, volunteers and patients were
killed, 64 were injured and 31 medical vehicles vandalized during these attacks.
·
There
are an estimated 776,000 internally displaced persons (IDPs) within Myanmar as
of the 1st December 2021, with huge refugee populations pouring into
India, Bangladesh and Thailand.
With all of this in mind, including
the figures concerning executions and deaths, needs are not being met. In fact,
these metrics (IDPs, Refugees, Deaths, Prices, Malnutrition) are rising. As
such, we should expect the conflict to continue with a great risk of escalation
as the situation progressively deteriorates.
Ethiopia
Although some may be
unaware, since November 2020 fighting has taken place between the Federal
Democratic Republic of Ethiopia and its northern most region that borders
Eritrea – Tigray. The conflict began when Ethiopian Prime Minister, Abiy Ahmed,
ordered a military assault against Tigrayan regional forces in response to an
attack on a government military base. This event followed an extended period of
political tension amid claims by Debretsion Gebremichael, the Tigrayan regional
President, and his party, the Tigray People’s Liberation Front (TPLF), that Abiy
Ahmed and the Prosperity Party Coalition – previously the Ethiopian People's
Revolutionary Democratic Front (EPRDF) that the TPLF were a part of – would be
an illegitimate government after the postponement of national elections due to
COVID-19 in 2020. This came to a head after: (a) the TPLF’s side-lining from
power and decades in control of the EPRDF, (b) the decision by Abiy for the
central government to suspend both funding and political ties with the region,
and (c) the continual and perhaps epi-phenomenal effects of ethnic federalism
that underpin Ethiopian politics. Consequently, institutional ethno-nationalist
and regionalist division had been baked-into the federal political system.
Interestingly, since
the conflict in Tigray began federal forces have been supported by
enemy-turned-friend Eritrea, bordering Tigray. This has been made possible in
succeeding an end to the twenty-year post-war territorial stalemate between the
two states, for which Abiy Ahmed won the Nobel Peace Prize in 2019.
Fundamentally, in regards to regional structure, this has adapted the wider regional
balance of power by virtue of such an unexpected alliance; reaffirming the
Liberal notion that cooperation between once warring states can be achieved
through an appeal to commonality.
Over subsequent months,
TPLF leaders regrouped and mobilised Tigrayans angered at massacres, rapes, and
havoc wreaked by federal and Eritrean troops; crimes claimed by both the Tigrayan
administration and the federal government.[14] Unexpectedly, the
Tigrayan rebels largely drove federal forces out of the region prior to the end
of June, ascertaining military preponderance in the area. Subsequently, the
conflict broadened. In 2021, the TPLF formed an alliance with a secessionist insurgent
group in Ethiopia’s populous central Oromia region, the Oromo Liberation Army
(OLA), who agreed to fight the Ethiopian Federal army across the west and south
of the country. In mid-November, however, a counteroffensive by federal troops and
allies forced Tigrayan forces to withdraw, surrendering any gains the TPLF had
previously made.
The federal forces
appear to be in the ascent, for now at least. Nonetheless, this situation has
since spurred on a wave of support for the TPLF, with secessionist groups in
each region joining the Tigrayan cause; groups now deemed terrorist
organisations by the government in the same way that the TPLF and OLA are. In
November 2021, the United Front of Ethiopian Federalist and Confederalist
Forces (UFEFCF) was formed between the TPLF and eight of these such rebel
groups, expanding the conflict into other regions. Nevertheless, this does not
make it impervious to potential internal fractures that may arise as the
conflict mutates.
Naturally, the conflict
has gained international attention. Diplomatically, both the African Union (AU)
and Kenya are pushing to arrange a cease-fire so that peace talks may begin. This
has been followed by statements from the US secretary of State, Anthony
Blinken, that Eritrea’s intervention has aided in the destabilisation of the
region, and as such, the US has sanctioned the Eritrean defence forces.[15] Equally, Ethiopia has
caused concerns amongst its neighbours about the construction of the Grand
Ethiopian Resistance Dam. The dam sits on the Blue Nile, upstream from Egypt
and Sudan, and is an integral pillar to Abiy Ahmed’s development and
modernisation policy – seeking to ascertain greater hydroelectric capabilities.
This has caused a series of clashes with Sudan and Egypt, clashes unable to be
effectively resolved in talks mediated by the AU due to fears that the dam will
imperil water supply and lead to a ‘water war’.[16] What we can see therefore
is a limit in the number of neighbours that Ethiopia can claim are wholly
allied with its interests.
Likewise, although the UN Security Council has
discussed the situation in dedicated meetings, a resolution has yet been
proposed or discussed, calling for “the respect of international humanitarian
law”, reiterating, “their support for the role of regional organizations,
namely the African Union and its High Representative for the Horn of African
Region” and their dedication to Ethiopian sovereignty.[17] Subsequently, we can
safely say that the conflict has had generated an increasingly regional as
opposed to international magnetism.
All of this being said,
the humanitarian needs inside Ethiopia’s conflict-ridden territories are
severely magnifying with every turn. Such a condition, once again, reconstructs
the high likelihood that conflict will intensify and continue, given the
inability for basic human needs to be met – irrespective of the political
causes discussed that may equally prolong the conflict. The following is an
aggregation of some of the most current data collected on the matter:[18]
· 63,110
Refugees have been estimated to have fled Ethiopia and now reside in Sudan, as
of the 7th of November 2021.
·
Currently,
the UNHCR estimates that there are 3.51 million IDPs in Ethiopia at present.
· According
to the WFP, an estimated 5.2 million people are in urgent need of food
assistance in the Tigray Region. This is followed closely by 1.7 million in the Afar
and Amhara provinces due to missed harvests and the collapse of the local
economy as a result of both the conflict itself and government blockades to
rebel-held territories. Agricultural support is therefore also desperately
required for malnutrition statistics to contract.
· Chronic
malnutrition ails 38% of Ethiopia’s children and is currently the highest cause
of death among under five-year-olds, increasing rapidly as food rations were
cut in November from 84 to 60% of the recommended daily kilo calorie intake.
· Adding
to this, humanitarian organisations have only been able to engage in a limited
programme of food distribution in Tigray, as stock and fuel has almost entirely
been exhausted, reaching only about 10,000 people between 6th and 12th
of January 2022. Indeed, the WFP has claimed that over 100 aid trucks are required
each day in Tigray, but only 1,355 arrived between July and November, severely
compounding the humanitarian crisis.
· 353,000
people were reported to experience famine conditions in early June 2021. This
is a statistic that was updated to 400,000 in early July. Sadly, two out of
10,000 of these people are expected to die of hunger or malnutrition every day as
a consequence of the man-made famine conditions in the region.
· Across
Tigray, 54% of water points are not functional, affecting water access to 3.5
million people. As a result of this, the famine that Ethiopia is currently
experiencing is expected to reach the most dangerous level of classification.
Afghanistan
Over the course of the past
year, a new chapter in the story of Afghanistan began, adding only to its
plight. After years of encircling provincial and district centres, the Taliban
finally regained control of Afghanistan; perhaps to an even greater extent of
rule than they held prior to their removal by the American led force at the
beginning of the so-called ‘forever war’ in 2001. Although the North Atlantic
Treaty Organisation (NATO) task force had held the Taliban at bay for many
years, it became clear in the summer of 2021 that years of state-building and
counter-insurgency training were being wholly upheld by the NATO presence,
especially that of air supremacy. Come May 2021, the deadline for the US to
remove troops – naturally followed by those of the other NATO members – arrived,
as per the agreement made in 2020 between the then US president Donald Trump
and the Taliban in Doha.
As the end to NATO
operations came, the Taliban’s programme of rural dominance led to provincial
dominance, safe in the knowledge that the internationalist foundations of
state-security and counter-insurgency were quickly evaporating. By August, amid
scenes at Kabul international airport of attempted mass-exodus, logistical
panic and nationwide military demoralisation, the Taliban were able to seize
control of the capital unscathed. From
here, they were able to form a government with a monopoly of legitimate force
across the Afghan territory, to use the phraseology of the famed sociologist
and political thinker Max Weber.[19]
Afghanistan is now
understood broadly as an Islamic theocracy, arising from the Deobandi Islamism
and dominantly ethnic Pashtun makeup of the new Taliban regime, led by Hibatullah
Akhundzada. This has, naturally, come with the implementation of religious law
in line with the Taliban’s interpretation of Islamic holy texts; fundamentally
leading to the undermining of Afghan political rights and civil liberties,
especially in regards to Women’s rights and the capability to publicly appear
and oppose the regime.[20] In response to the return
of the Taliban and its seizure of government, much of the globe’s power centres
chose to freeze Afghan state assets, halting financial aid and offering limited
sanctions relief for humanitarian purposes only. This has led to the drastic
economic collapse of Afghanistan.
Indeed, since the
Taliban seized power in august, the Afghani has fallen almost 25% against the
dollar, to an exchange of ؋105/$1, falling from 1$/80؋ before the regime change,
making it among the world’s worst-performing currencies over the past six
months.[21] This is in part caused,
and sustained, by the freezing of assets, calculated to the sum of $9 billion,
previously disposable to the Afghan central bank, meaning that civil servants
and what little public service providers there are will be going unpaid by the
state. Consequently, such action has led to a liquidity crisis wherein there
simply is a lack of cash, prompting the return of currency traders on the
streets of major urban centres and market towns in order to keep what is left
of the economy afloat.
Internationally there
has been a recognition that sanctions are contributing to the Afghan economic
collapse. On January 26th 2022, the UN Security Council met to
discuss the collapse of Afghanistan and the crises engulfing the state.[22] Here, Secretary-General
António Guterres described Afghanistan as “on the brink of collapse”, amid what
the International Monetary Fund (IMF) estimates
to be a 30% contraction of gross domestic product (GDP), claiming that “Afghanistan is hanging by a thread”.
Following this, the Permanent Representative of India to the UN, T.S. Tirumurti,
briefed the Council in his capacity as Chair of the Committee created in
accordance to S/RES/1988 – implementing sanctions on the
Taliban – explaining that the goal of sanctions is to facilitate conditions
that promote discourse and ultimately result in peace and stability.
China’s representative
called for an end to all unilateral sanctions, which have fundamentally hindered
Afghan access to financing and liquidity.
Similarly, the Chinese delegation highlighted that neither the quantity
nor quality of aid deliveries had improved since the adoption of S/RES/2615, demonstrating that the issue of
aid had been politicized by belligerents seeking to utilise humanitarian assistance
as a bargaining chip. In essence, the outcome of the January meeting stands
testimony to the inherently divided nature of the Security Council, whereby
great power politics and the rhetoric of such still plays a role.
This transpires as
Afghanistan is currently experiencing its worst drought in decades. Thought by
UN climatologists to have occurred as a result of a La Nina event in late 2020
that dramatically altered the country’s weather patterns for 2021, the drought
has markedly affected 25 of the state’s 34 provinces, with an estimation that
the 2021 harvest intake was a 20% decrease on 2020’s already reduced intake.[23] This has led to an
increase in the number of IDPs and refugees, leaving their homes so as to not
be a victim of the drought. This is without taking into account those refugees
and IDPs resulting from the political turmoil.
Alongside these
factors, although violence has a whole has decreased – given that the main
belligerent causing past violence is now the governing power – the Taliban face
a great deal of resistance from the Islamic State group in the Khorasan region
(ISIS-K), in the North-East of Afghanistan, whom the Taliban have been fighting
themselves for some time.[24] Over the course of the
past year, ISIS-K have taken advantage of the adapting political situation and regime
change as any militant or insurgent group would, in order to spread both its
influence and control in the region. Such action has gone hand in hand with an upsurge
in the number of terrorist attacks by the group, such as that on Kabul
international airbase during the summer pandemonium, or the November 2nd
attack on the Daoud Khan Military Hospital in Kabul, killing at least 25.[25] In this regard, in some
of Afghanistan’s provinces the Taliban are befalling resistance that mirrors
its own past tactics.
This being said,
perhaps this condition has changed since the death of Abu Ibrahim al-Hashimi
al-Qurayshi, the leader of ISIS, on February 3rd 2020. US operations
in Idlib, Northern Syria, successfully eliminated the ISIS figurehead, signalling
most saliently that unilateral US military action in the region is not yet
something of the past – not without the collateral damage of thirteen civilians
it must be states.[26] The likelihood is that
al-Qurayshi will be replaced by an individual like Abu Fatima al-Jaheishi, who
is currently head of operations in Iraq and has years of both governing and
insurgency experience with ISIS. Although ISIS-K function somewhat
independently, or at least somewhat distinctly, from ISIS as a whole, the
extent to which the leadership vacancy will affect their operations is not yet
known. Perhaps this will lead to greater attacks on the orders of al-Qurayshi’s
replacement, should they be so inclined. Nonetheless, this is still an answer
to be desired and little is gained from speculation. This being said, ISIS-K
attacks will continue to aid the deterioration of the crisis in Afghanistan. The
question is whether this will be of a continuing or greater impact than the
other factors discussed.
So, what do the
statistics tell us about Afghanistan? What does the data suggest? The following
is an aggregation of some of the most current data collected on the matter:[27]
· 24.4
million Afghans are currently in need of humanitarian assistance, over 62% of the
entire Afghan population, including 12.9 million children.
· 22.8
million Afghans are projected to be acutely food insecure in 2022, with 8.7
million at risk of famine-like conditions.
·
50%
of children under 5 years of age are expected to be acutely malnourished.
· Earthquakes
of over 5.3 magnitude have affected Badghis province since January 2022,
leaving thousands homeless.
· There
are currently 3.7 million IDPs in Afghanistan and 2.6 million Afghani refugees
who have fled the country. Of those who have fled the country, 2.2 million are
registered in Iran and Pakistan alone.
· Afghanistan
could see near universal poverty of 97% by mid-2022, an increase from 47%, according
to the projections of the UN Development Programme.
Afghanistan, as General
Secretary Guterres quite rightfully observed, is hanging by a thread. Its
economy has collapsed, agricultural product can neither be bought nor sold, its
population are ridden by drought, the number of refugees and IDPs continues to
increase with this, the ability for aid to reach those in need is thinning, and
the provincial terror threat from ISIS is perhaps at one of the highest points
it has ever been. All of these factors, therefore, thoroughly increase the
chances that Afghanistan will either: (a) collapse into a failed state, causing
a power vacuum and subsequent conflict between factions for command of state
sovereignty, or (b) spiral into a condition of intra-state conflict prompted by
such human insecurity and lack of access to basic needs.
Haiti
On the 7th
of July 2021, Haitian President Jovenel Moïse was assassinated in his home.
Although over half a year has passed since his assassination, the event is
still something of a mystery. The police allege that Moïse was shot twelve
times, his bones broken, eyes gouged out and that the culprits were a group of
26 Colombians and two Haitian Americans, suspectedly hired by a Haitian doctor
as part of a plot to become president.[28]
Following the
assassination, Haitian political elites quarrelled over who should succeed as
president. Moïse had appointed Ariel Henry as the new Prime Minister but he had
not yet been sworn in, causing disagreement as to his legitimacy. Nonetheless,
Henry eventually had become Haiti’s interim leader, but nonetheless Henry has
thoroughly struggled to assert authority amidst widespread factional and
quasi-political violence, where Haiti has seen the murder of journalists on the
street and over 780 kidnappings between January and October 2021 alone –
affirming the inability of the authorities to protect it citizens.[29]
Such political and
social crisis was then compounded in August. On the 14th of August
2021, a magnitude 7.2 earthquake hit Haiti’s Tiburon Peninsula. According to
the International Medical Corps, at least 2,248 were killed, 12,763 people were
injured, 137,585 homes were damaged or destroyed and thousands displaced.[30] Haiti ranks 170th
(out of 189) on the Human Development Index, over half the population suffer
from acute food insecurity and current estimates forecast a poverty rate of
60%, third highest ranking country most effected by extreme weather events
since 2000, and amidst this the estimated economic damage to the earthquake is
expected to be $1.11 billion, 7.8% of Haiti’s 2019 GDP.[31] Accordingly, amidst political
complexity, the August earthquake has only made needs more difficult to meet
and insecurity more probable.
Since the August
earthquake, political elites have factionally bifurcated, with one group
following Henry and another insisting root and branch reform of the entire
political system – ‘The Commission for a Haitian Solution to the Crisis’,
comprising a number of political parties, opposition groups and civil society
movements. Constitutionally, Haiti is at a crossroads, with gang violence in
the streets and political, economic and social division defining the situation
in the wake of both the assassination and the summer natural disaster.
As far as the political
situation is concerned, this position was not totally unpredictable. Indeed,
scholars like Georges Fauriol, of the Center for Strategic and International
Studies (CSIS) and the Caribbean Policy Consortium, highlighted the potential
for 2021 to become a volatile year in Haitian politics. Amidst the Moïse
administration becoming increasingly authoritarian and the disputation
surrounding the end date of the Moïse presidential term, Haiti, Fauriol stated,
had found itself in a “cycle of instability” that could easily spiral into
widespread civil conflict and that “The international community should urgently
take note of the situation in Haiti.”[32] As 2022 begins, it is
safe to say that Fauriol was correct and his warning should be carried over for
another year.
Venezuela
Venezuela has been in
turmoil for a number of years now. Broadly speaking, such a condition is
subsequent to mass-protests, questionable elections, economic collapse and the authoritarian
policies of President Nicolas Maduro. Seen by many as being a ‘petrostate’ –
whereby the economy of the state is deeply interconnected to and reliant on fuel
exports, controlled tightly by elites – Venezuela has been a deteriorating
state since the price of oil fell from over $100 to under $60 a barrel in early
2016; where oil sales constitute roughly a quarter of GDP and 99% of all export
earnings.[33]
With the annual inflation rate in 2018 reaching an extraordinary 65,370%,
according to the IMF, with prices doubling every 19 days on average, in 2021
this figure sat at 686.4%.[34] Additionally, GDP is
falling annually, oil production is dropping, crude cargos are being returned,
exports are declining, and food and medicine supplies have been evaporating
amid further sanctions, leading to further only the humanitarian crisis caused
by the economic implosion.[35]
Amidst such
catastrophe, violence has crept back onto the streets of urban areas. The
Maduro regime faces a dual set of potential conflicts. In the first instance,
both politically and criminally motivated gang violence has dramatically
increased over the past year in Venezuela’s cities, such as in the case of the
Cota 905 group in western Caracas. Gun battles have emerged more prominently
between non-state belligerents and security forces as street gangs have been
able to acquire military grade weaponry, following a pact made by the Maduro administration
with a number of gangs to lower violent crime in return for de facto
control of urban areas without the territorial intervention of state
security forces.[36]
In the second instance,
although the historic Colombian peace deal was signed in 2016, a handful of
revolutionary militia and paramilitary groups refused to lay down arms, namely
the National Liberation Army (ELN) and the Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia
(FARC). The continuation of hostility between these groups and the central
governing powers of Colombia has invariably led to open conflict amongst
themselves, leading to a non-state conflict on the border with Venezuela that
appears to be erupting at an ever-increasing velocity in early 2022.[37] This, naturally, also
means that Colombia holds the potential to descend into conflict in 2022.
Amongst this, in early January 2022, Venezuela was accused by Colombia of
harbouring the ELN and FARC after clashes left over 20 civilians dead. In
response to the event, Colombian President Iván Duque claimed that: “These
groups have been operating at ease in Venezuelan territory with the consent and
protection of the dictatorial regime”, despite Venezuelan refutation to this
assertion.[38]
Although this will most
likely not lead to conflict between Venezuela and Colombia, conflictual
rhetoric is heightening. This is so, especially, given that: (a) the two states
cut diplomatic ties with the ascendency of Duque to President in Colombia, and
(b) Colombia has served as a haven for Venezuelan refugees and opponents to the Maduro regime,
and as such the aiding of such guerrilla forces may indeed be in the interest
of the Venezuelan government, effecting the status of the peace that was so
arduously won in 2016 and thus the global soft power perception of Colombia – being
a regional competitor.
In discussion of
refugees, it must be mentioned, as with the other cases discussed, that
Venezuela has an extremely complicated and problematic refugee concern. As one
can imagine, the continuous train of life-demeaning events has severely
increased the number of refugees over the past decade; without mentioning the
state-sponsored repression of citizens. Globally, there are currently 5.9
million Venezuelan refugees, with the majority remaining in the region and with
millions pouring into Colombia, and Peru.[39] The sheer number of
refugees has led to problems of providing basic needs such as shelter, nutrition,
bodily security, legal status and protection from harm, greatly influencing the
forced migration patterns of the region and all such destabilisation this
entails.[40]
Compounding all of
this, led by Juan Guaido – deemed the legitimate winner of the 2018
presidential election by most western states – the opposition to the Maduro
government are planning a series of mass-protests, supposedly beginning on the
12th of February 2022, as Venezuela’s divided opposition look to the
presidential elections in 2024.[41] In 2018, such
mass-protests were met with mass-repression and even calls for a potential US
intervention in order to stabilise the region and sure up the Monroe doctrine.
Nevertheless, if such planned protests are able to mobilise as many as the
opposition hopes, Maduro’s response could trigger a wider conflict, especially
given the adaptation of the economic, political, geo-political and humanitarian
context in 2022 to that of 2018.
Some Final Thoughts
The purpose of this
investigation was to shine a light on five of the conflicts that may emerge in
2022 but do not necessarily involve the major powers. It was found that in Myanmar,
Ethiopia, Afghanistan, Haiti and Venezuela, there is a worrying risk of conflict
breaking out, be that in intra-state or non-state modalities. More significantly
perhaps, it is important when discussing such matters that we think not of the ‘high
politics’ of such conflict alone, but of their humanitarian costs in equal
measure.
Behind all of these
tensions, every shot fired and every shot averted, are the already struggling
economies and health systems of these states. I have chosen to by and large redact
the impact of COVID-19 to these cases so that the particulars of each state’s
situation could be examined independently. It would thus be pertinent to remind
the onlooker that amidst such social and political fractures pushing these societies
closer to war is the spread of a virus, an entity that cannot be neither negotiated
with nor beaten by sheer force alone. Myanmar has only fully vaccinated 34.6%
of its population, Venezuela – 48.1%, Afghanistan – 10.2%, Ethiopia – 1.4% and
Haiti – 0.8%; comparing greatly to the UK’s 72.4% or the US’s 64.5%.[42] We should expect COVID-19
to become a factor in all of these conflicts if both infection and mortality rates
increase as a result of the virus’ spread, alongside the economic or structural
inability of these states to effectively mechanise public infrastructure to
combat such a dissemination. Therefore, as funds will be diverted, we can only
expect the virus to propagate in these areas, intensifying the inability for
basic needs to be met and consequently the potential for human suffering.
Finally, at the heart
of these conflicts are humans attempting to simply live their daily lives. As
these conflicts escalate, the humanitarian situation deepens to a worser
condition. Thus, overall, although the undercurrents of contemporary global conflict
may not statistically have been seen to have led to an increase in battle
deaths, the situation is steadily worsening on the human level, of being able
to provide the basic needs of millions. This only corrodes the potentiality for
peace further. Expect, subsequently, 2022 to be a year of such corrosion. Even
so, as I stated at the open of this exploration, 2022 may well be a brighter
and more peaceful year – but if so, luck and fortune would have played their
part.
[1] David Motadel (2021) “Global
Revolution”. In David Motadel (Ed.), Revolutionary World: Global Upheaval in
The Modern Age. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, pp. 1-38, p. 7.
[2] Mary Kaldor (2012) New and Old
Wars. Third Edition. Cambridge: Polity Press, p.2.
[3] The argument that NATO expansion
teases war with Russia, and so should be limited, still applies as from 2014 to
2021. Thus, see: John J. Mearsheimer (2014) ‘Why the Ukraine Crisis is the West’s
Fault: The Liberal Delusions That Provoked Putin’. Foreign Affairs.
93(5): 77-84.
[4] Kenneth Waltz (1979) Theory of
International Politics. Reading, MA: Addison-Wesley Publishing Company, pp.
186-187. John H. Herz (1950) ‘Idealist Internationalism and The Security
Dilemma’. World Politics. 2(2): 157-180.
[5] Comfort Ero and Richard Atwood
(2021) ‘10 Conflicts to Watch in 2022’. crisisgorup.org. Available at: https:// www.crisisgroup.org/global/10-conflicts-watch-2022.
[6] David Brown (2022 Jan. 12). ‘China
and Taiwan: A Really Simple Guide to a Growing Conflict’. bbc.co.uk. Available
at: https://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-asia-china-59900139.
[7]Therese Pettersson, Shawn Davis,
Amber Deniz, Garoun Engström, Nanar Hawach, Stina Högbladh, Margareta
Sollenberg & Magnus Öberg (2021). ‘Organized violence 1989-2020, with a
special emphasis on Syria’. Journal of Peace Research, 58(4): 809-825. United
Nations (2021 Dec. 2.) ‘Emergency aid needs set to rise by 17% to assist 274
million, UN humanitarians warn’. news.un.org. Available at: https://news.un.org/en/story/2021/12/11 06932. UNHCR (2022) ‘Refugee
Statistics’. unrefugees.org. Available at: https://www.unrefugees.org/refugee-f
acts/statistics/.
[8] Assistance Association for
Political Prisoners (2022 Feb. 1.) ‘The Assistance Association for Political
Prisoners (Burma)’. aappb.org. Available at: https://aappb.org/?p=19961.
[9] The Armed Conflict Location and
Event Data Project (ACLED)(2022) Curated Data: Number of reported fatalities by
country-year. acleddata.com. Available at: https://acleddata.com/curated-data-files/.
[10] UNICEF (2022) ‘Rohingya Crisis’. unicef.org.
Available at: https://www.unicef.org/emergencies/rohingya-cri
sis#:~:text=By%20the%20end%20of%20August,half%20of%20whom%20were%20children. See also: United Nations Office
for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (2020) ‘Rohingya Refugee Crisis’. unocha.org.
Available at: https://www.unocha.org/rohingya-refugee-crisis.
[11] UN Meetings Coverage and Press
Releases (2021 Dec. 29.) ‘Security Council Press Release - SC/14754’. un.org
/press. Available at: https://www.un.org/press/en/2021/sc14754.doc.htm.
[12] John Burton (1990) Conflict:
Human Needs Theory, Basingstoke: The Macmillan Press Ltd.
[13] These statistics have been
aggregated from data compiled of the following sources: World Food Programme
(2021 Dec. 3.) ‘WFP Myanmar: Situation Report #5, October-November 2021’. wfp.
org. Available at: https://api.godocs.wfp.org/api/documents/bef7b4ad672a4b2a82c6c0287696fb33/download/?_ga=2.38923747.132373550.1643032037-1108988988.1643032037. United Nations Office for the
Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (2022 Jan. 17.) ‘Myanmar: Humanitarian
Update No.14’. reliefweb.int. Available at: https://reliefweb.int/
sites/reliefweb.int/files/resources/OCHA%20Myanmar%20-%20Humanitarian%20Update
%20No.14_FINAL. pdf.
UNHCR Regional Bureau for Asia and Pacific (2022 Jan. 20.) ‘Myanmar Emergency
Update as of 17 January 2022’. reporting.unhcr.org. Available at: https://reporting.unhcr.org/document/1326. United Nations Human Rights
Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights (2021 May. 11.) ‘Press
briefing notes on Myanmar’. ohchr.org. Available at: https://www.ohchr.org/EN/NewsEvents/Pages/DisplayNews.aspx?NewsID=27079&La
ngID=E.
[14] BBC News (2021 Sep. 5.)
‘Ethiopia's Tigray conflict: Thousands reported killed in clashes’. bbc.co.uk.
Available at: https://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-africa-58450223.
[15] Nosmot Gbadamosi (2021 Nov. 17.)
‘Can African Leaders End Ethiopia’s War?’. foreignpolicy.com. Available
at: https://foreignpolicy.com/2021/11/17/ethiopia-tigray-war-abiy-african-union-kenya/.
[16] Mahmoud Mourad (2021 June 9.)
‘Egypt and Sudan urge Ethiopia to negotiate seriously over giant dam’. reuters.com.
Available at: https://www.reuters.com/world/middle-east/egypt-sudan-urge-ethiopia-negotiate-seriously-over-giant-dam-2021-06-09/.
[17] United Nations (2021 Nov. 5.) ‘Security
Council “deeply concerned” by expanding clashes in northern Ethiopia’. news.un.org.
Available at: https://news.un.org/en/story/2021/11/1105072.
[18] World Food Programme (2021) ‘WFP
Ethiopia: Country Brief – November 2021’. docs.wfp.org. Available at: https://docs.wfp.org/api/documents/WFP-0000136130/download/?_ga=2.80176151.1242531317.1643287300-1
108988988.1643032037.
United Nations Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (2022 Jan.
20.) ‘Northern Ethiopia Humanitarian Update: Situation Report’. reliefweb.int.
Available at: https://reliefweb.int/sites/ reliefweb.int/files/resources/Situation%20Report%20-%20Ethiopia%20%20Northern%20Ethiopia%20Humanit
arian%20Update %20-%2020%20Jan%202022.pdf. Hagos Godefay (2022 Jan. 26.) ‘Data shows siege and
destruction of health system are causing preventable deaths in Tigray’. ethiopia-insigt.com.
Available at: https://
www.ethiopia-insight.com/2022/01/26/data-shows-siege-and-destruction-of-health-system-are-causing-prevent
able-deaths-in-tigray/.
Sofie Annys, Tim Vanden Bempt, Emnet Negash, Lars De Sloover, Robin Ghekiere., Kiara
Haegeman, Daan Temmerman and Jan Nyssen (2021) Tigray: Atlas of the Humanitarian
Situation. Version 2.2. Ghent: Ghent University, Department of Geography. https://doi.org/10.5281/zenodo.5804284. UNHCR (2022) ‘Global Focus:
Ethiopia’. reporting.unhcr.org. Available at: https://reporting.unhcr.org/ethiopia.
[19] Max Weber (2004) “Politics as a Vocation”, in David Owen and
Tracy B. Strong (Ed.), The Vocation Lectures: Science as a Vocation -
Politics as a Vocation. Indianapolis, IN: Hackett Publishing Company. pp.
32-94, p. 33.
[20] Lindsay Maizland (2021) ‘The
Taliban in Afghanistan’. cfr.org. Available at: https://www.cfr.org/back
grounder/taliban-afghanistan.
BBC News (2021 Nov. 21.) ‘Afghanistan: Taliban unveil new rules banning women
in TV dramas’. bbc.co.uk. Available at: https://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-asia-59368488#:~:text=Afghanistan
%3A%20Taliban%20unveil%20new%20rules%20banning%20women%20in%20TV%20dramas,21%20November%202021&text=Women%20have%20been%20banned%20from,imposed%20by%20the%20Taliban%20government.&text=During%20their%20previous%20rule%20in,from%20education%20and%20the%20workplace. Aljazeera (2021 Dec. 28.) ‘Afghan
women call for rights, protest alleged Taliban killings’. Available at: https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2021/12/28/afghan-women-call-for-rights-protest-allege
d-taliban-killings.
[21] Benjamin Parkin and Tommy
Stubbington (2022 Jan. 16.) ‘Afghanistan’s currency crisis leaves millions at
risk of starvation’. ft.com. Available at: https://www.ft.com/content/3f692e15-0e78-4fe3-845f-74093fafd904.
[22] United Nations Meetings Coverage
and Press Releases (2022 Jan. 26.) ‘Security Council - 8954th
Meeting (AM) Meeting Coverage’. un.org/press. Available at: https://www.un.org/press/en/2022/sc14776.doc.htm.
[23] Mstyslav Chernov (2021 Dec. 10.)
‘Afghanistan Shrivels in Worst Drought in Decades’. thediplomat.com. Available
at: https://thediplomat.com/2021/12/afghanistan-shrivels-in-worst-drought-in-decades/#:~:text=agricu
lture%20might%20collapse.%E2%80%9D-,U.N.,has%20long%20seen%20regular%20droughts.
[24] Comfort Ero and Richard Atwood
(2021) ‘10 Conflicts to Watch in 2022’. crisisgroup.org. Available at: https ://www.crisisgroup.org/global/10-conflicts-watch-2022.
[25] Thomas Gibbons-Neff, Sami Sahak
and Taimoor Shah (2021 Nov. 3.) ‘Dozens Killed in ISIS Attack on Military
Hospital in Afghanistan’s Capital’. nytimes.com. Available at: https://www.nytimes.com/2021/11/02/world/asia/
afghanistan-kabul-hospital-attack.html.
[26] Max Boot (2022 Feb. 3.) ‘Killing
of Islamic State Leader Signals Why U.S. Presence in Mideast Will Continue’. cfr.org.
Available at: https://www.cfr.org/in-brief/killing-islamic-state-leader-signals-why-us-presence-mideast-will-continue.
[27] World Food Programme (2022 Feb.
3.) ‘WFP Afghanistan: Situation Report’. reliefweb.int. Available at: https:// reliefweb.int/sites/reliefweb.int/files/resources/AFG%20External%20Sitrep_03.02.2022.pdf. UNICEF (2022) ‘Afghanistan –
Humanitarian Action for Children’. reliefweb.int. Available at: https://reliefweb.int/sites/reliefwe
b.int/files/resources/2022-HAC-Afghanistan.pdf. UNHCR (2022) ‘UNHCR –
Afghanistan’. unhcr.org. Available at: https://www.unhcr.org/uk/afghanistan.html#:~:text=Afghans%20make%20up%20one%20of,for%20refuge%
20within%20the%20country.
[28] BBC News (2022 Jan. 20.) ‘Haiti
president's assassination: What we know so far’. bbc.co.uk. Available
at: https://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-latin-america-57762246.
[29] Jihan Abdalla (2022 Jan. 18.)
‘“Citizens are not protected”: What does 2022 hold for Haiti?’. aljazeera.com.
Available at: https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2022/1/18/citizens-are-not-protected-what-does-2022-hold-for-ha
iti. Laura
Gottesdiener (2022 Jan. 7.) ‘Two Haitian journalists killed by gang outside
Port-au-Prince’. reuters.com. Available at: https://www.reuters.com/business/media-telecom/two-haitian-journalists-killed-by-gang-outside-p
ort-au-prince-2022-01-07/.
[30] International Medical Corps (2021
Sep. 10.) Haiti Earthquake - Situation Report #2. Los Angeles, CA:
International Medical Corps.
[31] WFP (2022) ‘Haiti’. Available at: https://www.wfp.org/countries/haiti. World Bank (2021 Nov. 8.) ‘The
World Bank in Haiti’. Available at: https://www.worldbank.org/en/country/haiti/overview#1.
[32] Georges A. Fauriol (2021 Feb. 5.) ‘'A
Cycle of Instability’: Haiti’s Constitutional Crisis’. americas.chatham house.org.
Available at: https://americas.chathamhouse.org/article/cycle-instability-haiti-constitutional-crisis/.
[33] Amelia Cheatham, Diana Roy, and
Rocio Cara Labrador (2021 Dec. 29) ‘Venezuela: The Rise and Fall of a
Petrostate’. cfr.org. Available at: https://www.cfr.org/backgrounder/venezuela-crisis#chapter-title-0-2.
[34] International Monetary Fund (2021)
‘Inflation rate, average consumer prices’. imf.org. Available at: https://ww
w.imf.org/external/datamapper/PCPIPCH@WEO/WEOWORLD/VEN?year=2019. Mayela Armas (2022 Jan. 8.)
‘Venezuela's inflation hit 686.4% in 2021 - central bank’. reuters.com.
Available at: https://www.reuters.com/wo
rld/americas/venezuelas-inflation-hit-6864-2021-central-bank-2022-01-08/.
[35] Tamara Taraciuk Broner (2021 July
8.) ‘Putting Venezuela’s Crisis on the International Agenda’. hrw.org. Available
at: https://www.hrw.org/news/2021/07/08/putting-venezuelas-crisis-international-agenda. Marianna Parraga and Mircely
Guanipa (2022 Feb. 2.) ‘Venezuela's oil exports fall to lowest since Sep amid
returned cargoes -data’. reuters.com. Available at: https://www.reuters.com/markets/europe/venezuelas-oil-exports-fall-l
owest-since-sep-amid-returned-cargoes-data-2022-02-02/.
[36] Reuters (2021 Jul. 8.) ‘Venezuela:
intense gun battles rage in Caracas between gangs and police’. theguardian .com.
Available at: https://www.theguardian.com/us-news/2021/jul/08/venezuela-caracas-gun-battles-police-gan
gs.
[37] Samantha Schmidt and Diana Durán
(2022 Feb. 4.) ‘Bloody fighting between guerrilla groups is terrorizing
Colombian border communities’. washingtonpost.com. Available at: https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/20
22/02/04/colombia-farc-eln-arauca/.
[38] DW News (2022 Jan. 3.) ‘Colombia:
Over 20 killed amid rebel clashes at Venezuelan border’. dw.com.
Available at: https://www.dw.com/en/colombia-over-20-killed-amid-rebel-clashes-at-venezuelan-border/a-6032
1179.
[39] UNHCR (2022) ‘Venezuela
Situation’. unhcr.org. Available at: https://www.unhcr.org/uk/venezuela-emergen
cy.html#:~:text=With%20over%205%20million%20Venezuelans,displacement%20crisis%20in%20the%20world.
[40] UNHCR (2021) ‘Venezuela Fact
Sheet’. reporting.unhcr.org. Available at: https://reporting.unhcr.org/docum ent/345.
[41] Reuters (2022 Jan. 24.) ‘Venezuelan
opposition's Guaido calls for February protest’. reuters.com. Available
at: https://www.reuters.com/world/americas/venezuelan-oppositions-guaido-calls-february-protest-2022-01-23/.
[42] Hannah Ritchie, Edouard Mathieu, Lucas Rodés-Guirao, Cameron Appel, Charlie Giattino, Esteban Ortiz-Ospina, Joe Hasell, Bobbie Macdonald, Diana Beltekian and Max Roser (2022) ‘Coronavirus Pandemic (COVID-19)’. OurWorldInData.org. Available at: https://ourworldindata.org/coronavirus.