Party |
May 3rd 2022 |
April 27th 2023 |
Change (%) |
Conservative |
34 |
29 |
-5 |
Labour |
39 |
43 |
+4 |
Liberal Democrats |
10 |
10 |
- |
Green |
5 |
6 |
+1 |
Reform |
3 |
6 |
+3 |
UKIP |
1 |
1 |
- |
Plaid Cymru |
1 |
1 |
- |
SNP |
4 |
4 |
- |
Figure
1 – United Kingdom National Parliament Voting Intention Poll of Polls (%)
[Politco].[2]
As Figure 1 attests, on May 3rd
2022, two days before the elections, there was only a 5-point disparity between
the Conservative and Labour parties. Now, almost a year later, this gap has
increased almost threefold to a 14-point gulf. Hence, if polling is anything to
go by, our initial instinct should be to assume that the Conservatives will see
a decrease in their nation-wide vote share at this local election. Before this
hypothesis is explored at some depth, why has this gap widened? Why, in their
thirteenth year of being in government, are the Conservatives seeing their
lowest polling figures since the 1990s? The purpose of this exploration will be
to survey responses to this query in service of painting for the reader the
context behind this cycle of local elections in May 2023.
There are a number of potential answers
to this question. For some, this is part and parcel of electoral politics.
Irrespective of the locality of the democratic political system undergoing
discussion, as time veers further from being handed a mandate to govern, the
incumbent party in government will tend to lose popularity as voter disillusionment
over the lack of pay-offs sets in.[3] In this light, it would
perhaps be unreasonable to suggest that the Conservative party should be immune
to such a common phenomenon, especially after being in government for longer
than the iPad has been on sale in the UK.
In this time there have been times of crisis, austerity, war, recession,
political polarisation, scandal, constitutional predicaments and the COVID-19
pandemic – all overseen by successive Conservative administrations.
Subsequently, we should perhaps stress that a popular Conservative party
would in fact be the anomalous outlier to such a recurring phenomenon, and
returning 29% of the national popular vote would indicate an odd bitter-sweet
success, given their length of governmental incumbency.
Nonetheless, this drop in popularity for
the incumbent governing party on the national level can be explained by the current
social, economic and political milieu. Most saliently, this is due in part to
the causal role that Conservative figures have played in contributing to such a
state of affairs by virtue of their decision-making. Specifically, Liz Truss and her Chancellor, Kwasi
Kwarteng, engaged in an economic programme of so-called ‘Trussenomics’.[4] An
ideologically charged ‘mini budget’ was to contain £45bn of unfunded tax cuts
and thus ‘forced’ the very invisible hand of the market, which Truss had so
vehemently praised as a guiding logic of judgement, to react by incurring a
flash financial decline that not only increased debt, but negatively affected
the value of the pound, pensions, mortgage rates and sliced through gilt yields
like a warm knife through butter.[5]
Consequently, questions about the Conservative Party’s economic competence have
become commonplace and negatively affected their standing, with 60% of
respondents to one YouGov poll in late January 2023 claiming the party is
incompetent.[6] Therefore,
following this, the party’s share of national voting intention has not yet
returned to its pre-Truss levels.
This
does certainly hold ramifications for the so-called ‘red wall’.[7]
In one particular study based on interviews in the Colne Valley constituency, part
of the Kirklees Metropolitan Borough Council, it was found that a number of Working-Class
voters realigned with the Conservative Party in 2019 as a result of: (a) Jeremy
Corbyn’s personality, (b) Brexit, and (c) The Conservative’s economic
competency.[8] This is
the first set of elections since 2019 that do not feature the personality of Boris
Johnson at play, where Corbyn has been replaced, and the economic competency of
the Tories has thoroughly been brought into question. Subsequently, the major
causes for working class realignment in 2019 have been overcome. In this regard,
those ‘red wall’ seats will be of particular interest as an indicator as to
whether this realignment holds given the changing circumstances.
On
a broader level, the discourse surrounding economic competency in the
post-COVID era has been wide reaching in effect. In April 2022 alone, household
energy prices increased by 54%, followed in October 2022 by a concurrent
increase of 27%, and then again in April 2023 by around 20%.[9]
This is in a mutually constitutive relationship with rising inflation. In May
2022 inflation sat at 7.8%, by March 2023 this has risen to 8.9% after reaching
the dizzying heights of 9.6% in the October; increasing from 0.7% in February
2021 in the long-view.[10]
This has naturally compounded daily living costs for most, increasing the price
of the most basic of amenities. As inflation means higher costs, real wages
have equally declined, with diminutions in both ‘Total Pay’ and ‘Regular Pay’
in-line with inflation.[11]
Such a condition can quickly lead to a negative spiral of economic decline if
recovery is managed poorly. Here both the cost (and thus price) of goods rise
in tandem with a decline in the spending power of the average consumer –
leading to economic contraction and further stagnation.
The
immediate effect of such a condition in open, pluralist, democracies is for
civic society to engage with one of its few mechanisms to influence policy,
that being its bottom-up bargaining power in the form of industrial or strike
action for better pay. This being said, strikes amongst junior doctors,
paramedics, teachers, barristers, transport workers, and so many more, have not
just concerned wage deflation but the decline in standards of public services,
mismanagement and underfunding. For instance, strikes by members of the British
Medical Association (BMA) are concerned primarily with pay, but also management
of standards to resolve: safety issues; the backlog in the National Health
Service (NHS), recorded in February 2023 as at over 7.21 Million patients; and monstruous
figures of cases wherein emergency patients have had to wait for over twelve
hours to be seen, sitting at 54,532 for December 2022 alone – up from 19,053 in
the May.[12] With
all of this in mind, it is unsurprising that between July 2022 and March 2023
alone there have been over 3 Million working days ‘lost’ to strike action.[13]
This
provides some of the context explaining why in the last year there has been
such a decrease in popularity for the incumbent governing party. Saying this
however, there are areas of policy in which the governing party have gained
some traction with sections of the voting public. Most notably, this has been
the case over immigration and asylum policy.
In
recent years the UK has experienced a rise in asylum applications. According to
statistics from the Home Office, in 2010 some 17,916 asylum applications were
made, before increasing to 32,733 in 2015, 50,042 in 2021 and then reaching 74,751
in 2022.[14] Although
this not being a new record – reserved for 84,132 applications made and over a
60% refusal rate in 2002 – the current refusal rate stands at its lowest since
1991, at 24%. Going hand in hand with the thesis that, alongside other
centre-right parties on the European continent, the Conservative party is
slowly drifting further into an increasingly populist, politically illiberal
yet economically neoliberal ‘right-wing’ of the political spectrum, Rishi
Sunak’s administration have consistently turned to these figures in order to
argue in favour of increased controls and powers over deportation.[15]
Such argumentation has metabolised in the passage through the Commons of the
Illegal Migration Bill, irrespective of potential incompatibilities in law with
the Human Rights Act (1998) or with Britain’s international obligations under
the European Convention of Human Rights (1951).
Nonetheless,
irrespective of this, the bill is responding to a certain public concern, which
has become more prominent with the introduction of the bill itself. Using a
series of polling trackers, we can observe that, when asked in late April 2023:
one-third of respondents considered immigration to be ‘mostly bad for the country’;
57% of respondents judged immigration to be too-high, increasing on figures
from February 2023 and with only 11% stating the inverse; and lastly, 80% of
respondents deem the government’s handling of immigration to be ‘bad’, with
this statistic increasing in value over time.[16]
This data is significant as is demonstrates: (a) a broad popular desire for
immigration reform; (b) high disillusionment with government action over the
issue; and (c) a small receptive section of the public for whom there is a high
probability that they will return support to the Conservatives for the passage
of the bill. Indeed, although it has not yet achieved royal assent, passing
only the Commons by a vote of 289-230 in favour, the discourse, rhetoric and
securitised narrative surrounding the passage of the bill has led to small polling
boost for the Tories, as expected.[17]
Issue |
8th May 2022 |
1st May 2023 |
Change (%) |
Health |
37 |
46 |
+9 |
Immigration/Asylum |
24 |
34 |
+10 |
Crime |
14 |
19 |
+5 |
The Economy |
60 |
57 |
-3 |
Tax |
16 |
11 |
-5 |
Pensions |
9 |
7 |
-2 |
Education |
10 |
14 |
+4 |
Childcare |
7 |
7 |
- |
Housing |
18 |
19 |
+1 |
Environment |
26 |
21 |
-5 |
Britain Leaving The EU |
18 |
17 |
-1 |
Transport |
3 |
4 |
+1 |
Welfare |
12 |
8 |
-4 |
Defence |
16 |
11 |
-5 |
Figure
2 – The Issues Perceived as The Most Important by The Public (%) [YouGov] [18]
Nonetheless,
when we take all of these factors into consideration, it allows us to
understand to a greater degree just quite why the Conservatives’ polling is at
a contemporary low, despite some popularity over certain issues. By looking at
Figure 2, what we can see is polling undertaken by YouGov concerning which
issue is considered the to be most important by members of the public at two
intervals: (a) on the week of the 2022 May local elections, and (b) from the
week before the 2023 May local elections, the most recent data available.
The
top three issues considered to be the most significant in Figure 2 are,
primarily, ‘the economy’, ‘Health’ and ‘Immigration/Asylum’, with increasing
changes in the magnitude of their salience to the public polled across the year
in two of three cases. In this period, the biggest change came with
consideration for the importance of immigration, overlapping with the above
section on the government’s response and mutual construction of the public’s
perspective on the issue. Interestingly, although economic indicators have
declined, also discussed above, there was a reduction by 3% of respondents who
considered ‘The Economy’ to be the most significant issue. Yet, however, it is
overwhelmingly the greatest concern after that of the Health service, returning
still 57% of respondents considering the economy to be the greatest of
concerns. Given the relationship of the status of the economy, in some degree,
to the decisions of key Conservatives, discussed above, and the significance so
many place on this as a defining issue, it is clear why there has been a
decline in popularity for the Conservatives.
All
in all, it is no surprise that parties and candidates will be standing on the issues
set out in Figure 2, appealing to the public by highlighting their own remedies
to these issues or the faults of others in dealing with them, riding the wave
of Conservative unpopularity. For instance, Figure 3 shows a Labour leaflet in
Sheffield utilising the very issue of the national economy to gain traction in
a local area, bandwagoning on some of the national issues discussed here,
above.[19]
Conversely, Figure 3 details a Conservative Party leaflet from Norwich, wherein
the issues laid in Figure 2 are clearly the centre of concern but yet attempts
to minimise any relationship to national or parliamentary politics where
popularity is in short supply.[20]
Figure 3 – Two campaign leaflets for the
2023 Local Elections. One by the Labour Party [Left] and one by the Conservative
Party [Right].
[1] Adam Tolley KC. (20th April
2023). ‘Formal Complaints About The Conduct of The Right Honourable Dominic
Raab MP, Deputy Prime Minister, Lord Chancellor and Secretary of State for
Justice: Investigation Report to The Prime Minister’. gov.uk. §176(2)b.,
p. 45. Available at: https://assets.
publishing.service.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/1152026/2023.04.20_Investigation_Report_to_the_Prime_Minister.pdf (Accessed 01/05/23).
[2] Politico. (1st May 2023). ‘Poll
of Polls: United Kingdom National Parliament Voting Intention’. Politico.eu.
https://www.politico.eu/europe-poll-of-polls/united-kingdom/ (Accessed 01/05/23).
[3] This of course concerns only those
polities whereby there is a functioning party system that entails a plurality
of electoral choice; wherein more than only one party dominates or can
realistically ascertain a mandate to govern.
[4] The theoretical foundation of
‘Trussenomics’ can be found in a single co-authored work by a handful of
Conservative MPs, see: Kwasi Kwarteng, Priti Patel, Dominic Raab, Chris
Skidmore, and Liz Truss. (2012). Britannia Unchained: Global Lessons for
Growth and Prosperity. Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan.
[5] Keith Fray, et.al. (October 22nd
2022). ‘How The Markets Broke Trussonomics’. The Financial Times. https://www.ft.com/content/156682c1-1fb9-42d1-aac3-de531e266d68 (Accessed 12th February 2023).
[6] The secondary point concerning the
opinion polls was taken from the Politico ‘UK Poll of Polls’, available
from: Politico. (February 12th 2023). ‘National Parliament Voting
Intention’. Politico. https://www.politico.eu/
europe-poll-of-polls/united-kingdom/
(Accessed 12th February 2023); YouGov. (2023). ‘Is The Conservative
Party Competent or Incompetent’. YouGov. https://yougov.co.uk/
topics/politics/trackers/is-the-conservative-party-competent-or-incompetent (Accessed 12th February 2023).
[7] For a discussion and definition of the ‘Red Wall’, see: J. Kanagasooriam,
E. Simon. (2021). ‘Red Wall: The Definitive Description’. Political Insight,
12(3): 8-11.
[8] Gavin Hart. (2022). ‘Working-class
conservative voters in 2019: voices from a valley in northern England’. British
Politics, 17(3): 298–314.
[9] Paul Bolton and Iona Stewart. (13th
March 2023). ‘Domestic Energy Prices: House of Commons Briefing Paper
CBP-9491’. London: House of Commons Library, p. 5.
[10] ‘Inflation’ as ‘Consumer Prices Index
including owner occupiers' housing costs’ (CPIH). Office of National
Statistics. (19 April 2023). ‘CPIH ANNUAL RATE 00: ALL ITEMS 2015=100’. ons.gov.uk.
https://www.ons.gov.uk/economy/inflationandpriceindices/timeseries/l55o/mm23 (Accessed 01/05/23).
[11] Office of National Statistics. (18
April 2023). ‘Average weekly earnings in Great Britain: April 2023’. ons.gov.uk.
https://www.ons.gov.uk/employmentandlabourmarket/peopleinwork/employmentandemplo
yeetypes/bulletins/averageweeklyearningsingreatbritain/april2023 (Accessed 03/05/23).
[12] BMA. (17 April 2020). ‘Junior Doctors
Guide to Strike Action’. bma.org.uk. https://www.bma.org.uk/our
-campaigns/junior-doctor-campaigns/pay/junior-doctors-strike-doctors-guide-to-industrial-action-2023. (Accessed 03/05/23); Anonymous A&E
Junior Doctor. (11 April 2023). ‘I’ll tell you why junior doctors are striking:
things are so unsafe we have no choice’. The Guardian. https://www.theguardian.com/
commentisfree/2023/apr/11/junior-doctors-strike-pay-nhs-corridors. (Accessed 03/05/23); BMA (2023) ‘NHS
Backlog Data Analysis’. https://www.bma.org.uk/advice-and-support/nhs-delivery-and-workforce
/pressures/nhs-backlog-data-analysis.
(Accessed 01/05/23); NHS England. (2023). ‘A&E Attendances and Emergency
Admissions 2022-23’. https://www.england.nhs.uk/statistics/statistical-work-areas/ae-waiting-times-and-activity/ae-attendances-and-emergency-admissions-2022-23/ (Accessed 01/05/23).
[13] Office of National Statistics. (18
April 2023). ‘Labour disputes; UK;Sic 07;total working days lost; all inds.
& services (000's)’. ons.gov.uk. https://www.ons.gov.uk/employmentandlabourmarket/peoplein
work/employmentandemployeetypes/timeseries/bbfw/lms. (Accessed 01/05/23).
[14] Georgina Sturge. (1 March 2023).
‘Asylum Statistics: House of Commons Briefing Paper SN01403’. London: House of
Commons Library. p. 11. It is important to note that: (a) Figures are for main
applicants only. (b) Initial decisions do not necessarily relate to
applications made in the same period. (c) Some people refused asylum at initial
decision may be granted leave to remain following an appeal.
[15] See: Richard Hayton. (2021). “The
United Kingdom: Conservatives and their Competitors in the post-Thatcher era”.
In Tim Bale and Cristóbal Rovira Kaltwasser (Ed.), Riding the Populist Wave: Europe's
Mainstream Right in Crisis. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. pp.
269-289.
[16] YouGov. (2023). ‘Immigration: Issue’. yougov.co.uk.
https://yougov.co.uk/topics/politics/explore/issue
/Immigration?content=trackers.
(Accessed 03/05/2023).
[17] Liam James. (13 March 2023). ‘Tories
see poll boost with Conservative voters over migration policy’. The Independent. https://www.independent.co.uk/news/uk/politics/conservative-tory-polls-migration-b
2300127.html (Accessed
03/05/23).
[18] YouGov. (1st May 2023). ‘The
most important issues facing the country’. yougov.co.uk. https://youg
ov.co.uk/topics/education/trackers/the-most-important-issues-facing-the-country. (Accessed 01/05/23).
[19] This picture has been taken from
Twitter: @LibDemRobReiss, and was uploaded on April 27th 2023. https://twitter.com/LibDemRobReiss/status/1651647875464437780/photo/2
(Accessed 03/05/23).
[20] This
Picture has been taken from Twitter: @ghosttrain00, and was uploaded on April
27th 2023. https://twitter.com/ghosttrain00/status/1651503309901946881/photo/2
(Accessed 03/05/23).
[21] For more information, see: G. Elliot
Morris. (2022). Strength in Numbers: How Polls Work and Why We Need Them. New
York: WW Norton, esp. Ch. 6 and 7; Mark Pack. (2022). Polling: The History,
Uses and Abuses of Political Opinion
Polls. London: Reaktion Books, esp. Ch. 7.