The 2023 UK Local Elections - A Context of Unpopularity


It might be hard to believe that since the May local elections in 2022, just one year ago, the UK has crowned two Prime Ministers, had four different Chancellors of the Exchequer, four education secretaries, and over sixty ministerial resignations across three administrations. The most recent of these has been the Deputy Prime Minister, Dominic Raab, after an independent report found his conduct to be: “intimidating, in the sense of unreasonably and persistently aggressive conduct in the context of a work meeting”, whilst involving, “abuse or misuse of power in a way that undermines or humiliates” without this being the intention of his actions.[1]

Party

May 3rd 2022

April 27th 2023

Change (%)

Conservative

34

29

-5

Labour

39

43

+4

Liberal Democrats

10

10

-

Green

5

6

+1

Reform

3

6

+3

UKIP

1

1

-

Plaid Cymru

1

1

-

SNP

4

4

-

Figure 1 – United Kingdom National Parliament Voting Intention Poll of Polls (%) [Politco].[2]

As Figure 1 attests, on May 3rd 2022, two days before the elections, there was only a 5-point disparity between the Conservative and Labour parties. Now, almost a year later, this gap has increased almost threefold to a 14-point gulf. Hence, if polling is anything to go by, our initial instinct should be to assume that the Conservatives will see a decrease in their nation-wide vote share at this local election. Before this hypothesis is explored at some depth, why has this gap widened? Why, in their thirteenth year of being in government, are the Conservatives seeing their lowest polling figures since the 1990s? The purpose of this exploration will be to survey responses to this query in service of painting for the reader the context behind this cycle of local elections in May 2023.

There are a number of potential answers to this question. For some, this is part and parcel of electoral politics. Irrespective of the locality of the democratic political system undergoing discussion, as time veers further from being handed a mandate to govern, the incumbent party in government will tend to lose popularity as voter disillusionment over the lack of pay-offs sets in.[3] In this light, it would perhaps be unreasonable to suggest that the Conservative party should be immune to such a common phenomenon, especially after being in government for longer than the iPad has been on sale in the UK.  In this time there have been times of crisis, austerity, war, recession, political polarisation, scandal, constitutional predicaments and the COVID-19 pandemic – all overseen by successive Conservative administrations. Subsequently, we should perhaps stress that a popular Conservative party would in fact be the anomalous outlier to such a recurring phenomenon, and returning 29% of the national popular vote would indicate an odd bitter-sweet success, given their length of governmental incumbency.

Nonetheless, this drop in popularity for the incumbent governing party on the national level can be explained by the current social, economic and political milieu. Most saliently, this is due in part to the causal role that Conservative figures have played in contributing to such a state of affairs by virtue of their decision-making. Specifically, Liz Truss and her Chancellor, Kwasi Kwarteng, engaged in an economic programme of so-called ‘Trussenomics’.[4] An ideologically charged ‘mini budget’ was to contain £45bn of unfunded tax cuts and thus ‘forced’ the very invisible hand of the market, which Truss had so vehemently praised as a guiding logic of judgement, to react by incurring a flash financial decline that not only increased debt, but negatively affected the value of the pound, pensions, mortgage rates and sliced through gilt yields like a warm knife through butter.[5] Consequently, questions about the Conservative Party’s economic competence have become commonplace and negatively affected their standing, with 60% of respondents to one YouGov poll in late January 2023 claiming the party is incompetent.[6] Therefore, following this, the party’s share of national voting intention has not yet returned to its pre-Truss levels.

This does certainly hold ramifications for the so-called ‘red wall’.[7] In one particular study based on interviews in the Colne Valley constituency, part of the Kirklees Metropolitan Borough Council, it was found that a number of Working-Class voters realigned with the Conservative Party in 2019 as a result of: (a) Jeremy Corbyn’s personality, (b) Brexit, and (c) The Conservative’s economic competency.[8] This is the first set of elections since 2019 that do not feature the personality of Boris Johnson at play, where Corbyn has been replaced, and the economic competency of the Tories has thoroughly been brought into question. Subsequently, the major causes for working class realignment in 2019 have been overcome. In this regard, those ‘red wall’ seats will be of particular interest as an indicator as to whether this realignment holds given the changing circumstances.

On a broader level, the discourse surrounding economic competency in the post-COVID era has been wide reaching in effect. In April 2022 alone, household energy prices increased by 54%, followed in October 2022 by a concurrent increase of 27%, and then again in April 2023 by around 20%.[9] This is in a mutually constitutive relationship with rising inflation. In May 2022 inflation sat at 7.8%, by March 2023 this has risen to 8.9% after reaching the dizzying heights of 9.6% in the October; increasing from 0.7% in February 2021 in the long-view.[10] This has naturally compounded daily living costs for most, increasing the price of the most basic of amenities. As inflation means higher costs, real wages have equally declined, with diminutions in both ‘Total Pay’ and ‘Regular Pay’ in-line with inflation.[11] Such a condition can quickly lead to a negative spiral of economic decline if recovery is managed poorly. Here both the cost (and thus price) of goods rise in tandem with a decline in the spending power of the average consumer – leading to economic contraction and further stagnation.

The immediate effect of such a condition in open, pluralist, democracies is for civic society to engage with one of its few mechanisms to influence policy, that being its bottom-up bargaining power in the form of industrial or strike action for better pay. This being said, strikes amongst junior doctors, paramedics, teachers, barristers, transport workers, and so many more, have not just concerned wage deflation but the decline in standards of public services, mismanagement and underfunding. For instance, strikes by members of the British Medical Association (BMA) are concerned primarily with pay, but also management of standards to resolve: safety issues; the backlog in the National Health Service (NHS), recorded in February 2023 as at over 7.21 Million patients; and monstruous figures of cases wherein emergency patients have had to wait for over twelve hours to be seen, sitting at 54,532 for December 2022 alone – up from 19,053 in the May.[12] With all of this in mind, it is unsurprising that between July 2022 and March 2023 alone there have been over 3 Million working days ‘lost’ to strike action.[13]

This provides some of the context explaining why in the last year there has been such a decrease in popularity for the incumbent governing party. Saying this however, there are areas of policy in which the governing party have gained some traction with sections of the voting public. Most notably, this has been the case over immigration and asylum policy.

In recent years the UK has experienced a rise in asylum applications. According to statistics from the Home Office, in 2010 some 17,916 asylum applications were made, before increasing to 32,733 in 2015, 50,042 in 2021 and then reaching 74,751 in 2022.[14] Although this not being a new record – reserved for 84,132 applications made and over a 60% refusal rate in 2002 – the current refusal rate stands at its lowest since 1991, at 24%. Going hand in hand with the thesis that, alongside other centre-right parties on the European continent, the Conservative party is slowly drifting further into an increasingly populist, politically illiberal yet economically neoliberal ‘right-wing’ of the political spectrum, Rishi Sunak’s administration have consistently turned to these figures in order to argue in favour of increased controls and powers over deportation.[15] Such argumentation has metabolised in the passage through the Commons of the Illegal Migration Bill, irrespective of potential incompatibilities in law with the Human Rights Act (1998) or with Britain’s international obligations under the European Convention of Human Rights (1951).

Nonetheless, irrespective of this, the bill is responding to a certain public concern, which has become more prominent with the introduction of the bill itself. Using a series of polling trackers, we can observe that, when asked in late April 2023: one-third of respondents considered immigration to be ‘mostly bad for the country’; 57% of respondents judged immigration to be too-high, increasing on figures from February 2023 and with only 11% stating the inverse; and lastly, 80% of respondents deem the government’s handling of immigration to be ‘bad’, with this statistic increasing in value over time.[16] This data is significant as is demonstrates: (a) a broad popular desire for immigration reform; (b) high disillusionment with government action over the issue; and (c) a small receptive section of the public for whom there is a high probability that they will return support to the Conservatives for the passage of the bill. Indeed, although it has not yet achieved royal assent, passing only the Commons by a vote of 289-230 in favour, the discourse, rhetoric and securitised narrative surrounding the passage of the bill has led to small polling boost for the Tories, as expected.[17]

Issue

8th May 2022

1st May 2023

Change (%)

Health

37

46

+9

Immigration/Asylum

24

34

+10

Crime

14

19

+5

The Economy

60

57

-3

Tax

16

11

-5

Pensions

9

7

-2

Education

10

14

+4

Childcare

7

7

-

Housing

18

19

+1

Environment

26

21

-5

Britain Leaving The EU

18

17

-1

Transport

3

4

+1

Welfare

12

8

-4

Defence

16

11

-5

Figure 2 – The Issues Perceived as The Most Important by The Public (%) [YouGov] [18]

Nonetheless, when we take all of these factors into consideration, it allows us to understand to a greater degree just quite why the Conservatives’ polling is at a contemporary low, despite some popularity over certain issues. By looking at Figure 2, what we can see is polling undertaken by YouGov concerning which issue is considered the to be most important by members of the public at two intervals: (a) on the week of the 2022 May local elections, and (b) from the week before the 2023 May local elections, the most recent data available.

The top three issues considered to be the most significant in Figure 2 are, primarily, ‘the economy’, ‘Health’ and ‘Immigration/Asylum’, with increasing changes in the magnitude of their salience to the public polled across the year in two of three cases. In this period, the biggest change came with consideration for the importance of immigration, overlapping with the above section on the government’s response and mutual construction of the public’s perspective on the issue. Interestingly, although economic indicators have declined, also discussed above, there was a reduction by 3% of respondents who considered ‘The Economy’ to be the most significant issue. Yet, however, it is overwhelmingly the greatest concern after that of the Health service, returning still 57% of respondents considering the economy to be the greatest of concerns. Given the relationship of the status of the economy, in some degree, to the decisions of key Conservatives, discussed above, and the significance so many place on this as a defining issue, it is clear why there has been a decline in popularity for the Conservatives.

All in all, it is no surprise that parties and candidates will be standing on the issues set out in Figure 2, appealing to the public by highlighting their own remedies to these issues or the faults of others in dealing with them, riding the wave of Conservative unpopularity. For instance, Figure 3 shows a Labour leaflet in Sheffield utilising the very issue of the national economy to gain traction in a local area, bandwagoning on some of the national issues discussed here, above.[19] Conversely, Figure 3 details a Conservative Party leaflet from Norwich, wherein the issues laid in Figure 2 are clearly the centre of concern but yet attempts to minimise any relationship to national or parliamentary politics where popularity is in short supply.[20]

Figure 3 – Two campaign leaflets for the 2023 Local Elections. One by the Labour Party [Left] and one by the Conservative Party [Right].

In summary, as this election begins, the context is one of a critical economic and social condition, which has ultimately intensified disillusionment with the incumbent governing party; a context of unpopularity. This explains why there has been a decline in popularity for the Conservative party since last year, at least as far as polling data is concerned. Nonetheless, polling can often be wrong for a number of reasons, be that as a result of methodological error, sampling biases or even issues with statistical weighting.[21] Consequently, we can now turn to thinking about the hypothesis that the Conservative party should expect a decline in vote share and thus share of council compositions and control. It is to the data we must now turn.


[1] Adam Tolley KC. (20th April 2023). ‘Formal Complaints About The Conduct of The Right Honourable Dominic Raab MP, Deputy Prime Minister, Lord Chancellor and Secretary of State for Justice: Investigation Report to The Prime Minister’. gov.uk. §176(2)b., p. 45. Available at: https://assets. publishing.service.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/1152026/2023.04.20_Investigation_Report_to_the_Prime_Minister.pdf (Accessed 01/05/23).

[2] Politico. (1st May 2023). ‘Poll of Polls: United Kingdom National Parliament Voting Intention’. Politico.eu. https://www.politico.eu/europe-poll-of-polls/united-kingdom/ (Accessed 01/05/23).

[3] This of course concerns only those polities whereby there is a functioning party system that entails a plurality of electoral choice; wherein more than only one party dominates or can realistically ascertain a mandate to govern.

[4] The theoretical foundation of ‘Trussenomics’ can be found in a single co-authored work by a handful of Conservative MPs, see: Kwasi Kwarteng, Priti Patel, Dominic Raab, Chris Skidmore, and Liz Truss. (2012). Britannia Unchained: Global Lessons for Growth and Prosperity. Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan.  

[5] Keith Fray, et.al. (October 22nd 2022). ‘How The Markets Broke Trussonomics’. The Financial Times. https://www.ft.com/content/156682c1-1fb9-42d1-aac3-de531e266d68 (Accessed 12th February 2023).

[6] The secondary point concerning the opinion polls was taken from the Politico ‘UK Poll of Polls’, available from: Politico. (February 12th 2023). ‘National Parliament Voting Intention’. Politico. https://www.politico.eu/ europe-poll-of-polls/united-kingdom/ (Accessed 12th February 2023); YouGov. (2023). ‘Is The Conservative Party Competent or Incompetent’. YouGov. https://yougov.co.uk/ topics/politics/trackers/is-the-conservative-party-competent-or-incompetent (Accessed 12th February 2023).

[7] For a discussion and definition of the ‘Red Wall’, see: J. Kanagasooriam, E. Simon. (2021). ‘Red Wall: The Definitive Description’. Political Insight, 12(3): 8-11.

[8] Gavin Hart. (2022). ‘Working-class conservative voters in 2019: voices from a valley in northern England’. British Politics, 17(3): 298–314.

[9] Paul Bolton and Iona Stewart. (13th March 2023). ‘Domestic Energy Prices: House of Commons Briefing Paper CBP-9491’. London: House of Commons Library, p. 5.

[10] ‘Inflation’ as ‘Consumer Prices Index including owner occupiers' housing costs’ (CPIH). Office of National Statistics. (19 April 2023). ‘CPIH ANNUAL RATE 00: ALL ITEMS 2015=100’. ons.gov.uk. https://www.ons.gov.uk/economy/inflationandpriceindices/timeseries/l55o/mm23 (Accessed 01/05/23).

[11] Office of National Statistics. (18 April 2023). ‘Average weekly earnings in Great Britain: April 2023’. ons.gov.uk. https://www.ons.gov.uk/employmentandlabourmarket/peopleinwork/employmentandemplo yeetypes/bulletins/averageweeklyearningsingreatbritain/april2023 (Accessed 03/05/23).

[12] BMA. (17 April 2020). ‘Junior Doctors Guide to Strike Action’. bma.org.uk. https://www.bma.org.uk/our -campaigns/junior-doctor-campaigns/pay/junior-doctors-strike-doctors-guide-to-industrial-action-2023. (Accessed 03/05/23); Anonymous A&E Junior Doctor. (11 April 2023). ‘I’ll tell you why junior doctors are striking: things are so unsafe we have no choice’. The Guardian. https://www.theguardian.com/ commentisfree/2023/apr/11/junior-doctors-strike-pay-nhs-corridors. (Accessed 03/05/23); BMA (2023) ‘NHS Backlog Data Analysis’. https://www.bma.org.uk/advice-and-support/nhs-delivery-and-workforce /pressures/nhs-backlog-data-analysis. (Accessed 01/05/23); NHS England. (2023). ‘A&E Attendances and Emergency Admissions 2022-23’. https://www.england.nhs.uk/statistics/statistical-work-areas/ae-waiting-times-and-activity/ae-attendances-and-emergency-admissions-2022-23/ (Accessed 01/05/23).

[13] Office of National Statistics. (18 April 2023). ‘Labour disputes; UK;Sic 07;total working days lost; all inds. & services (000's)’. ons.gov.uk.  https://www.ons.gov.uk/employmentandlabourmarket/peoplein work/employmentandemployeetypes/timeseries/bbfw/lms. (Accessed 01/05/23).

[14] Georgina Sturge. (1 March 2023). ‘Asylum Statistics: House of Commons Briefing Paper SN01403’. London: House of Commons Library. p. 11. It is important to note that: (a) Figures are for main applicants only. (b) Initial decisions do not necessarily relate to applications made in the same period. (c) Some people refused asylum at initial decision may be granted leave to remain following an appeal.

[15] See: Richard Hayton. (2021). “The United Kingdom: Conservatives and their Competitors in the post-Thatcher era”. In Tim Bale and Cristóbal Rovira Kaltwasser (Ed.),  Riding the Populist Wave: Europe's Mainstream Right in Crisis. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. pp. 269-289.

[16] YouGov. (2023). ‘Immigration: Issue’. yougov.co.uk. https://yougov.co.uk/topics/politics/explore/issue /Immigration?content=trackers. (Accessed 03/05/2023).

[17] Liam James. (13 March 2023). ‘Tories see poll boost with Conservative voters over migration policy’.  The Independent. https://www.independent.co.uk/news/uk/politics/conservative-tory-polls-migration-b 2300127.html (Accessed 03/05/23).

[18] YouGov. (1st May 2023). ‘The most important issues facing the country’. yougov.co.uk. https://youg ov.co.uk/topics/education/trackers/the-most-important-issues-facing-the-country. (Accessed 01/05/23).

[19] This picture has been taken from Twitter: @LibDemRobReiss, and was uploaded on April 27th 2023. https://twitter.com/LibDemRobReiss/status/1651647875464437780/photo/2 (Accessed 03/05/23).

[20] This Picture has been taken from Twitter: @ghosttrain00, and was uploaded on April 27th 2023. https://twitter.com/ghosttrain00/status/1651503309901946881/photo/2 (Accessed 03/05/23).

[21] For more information, see: G. Elliot Morris. (2022). Strength in Numbers: How Polls Work and Why We Need Them. New York: WW Norton, esp. Ch. 6 and 7; Mark Pack. (2022). Polling: The History, Uses and Abuses of  Political Opinion Polls. London: Reaktion Books, esp. Ch. 7.