The
Reason of State[1]
Giovanni Botero
Notes
I.
What is Reason of State[2]
Reason of state is knowledge of the
means suitable to found, conserve, and expand dominion. It is true that
speaking absolutely, it encompasses all three of the above; nevertheless, it
appears that taken more strictly it designates conservation more than the other
two, and of the other two more expansion than foundation. The reason is that
reason of state presupposes a prince and a state which are not at all
presupposed by foundation and only in part by expansion; rather they are preceded
by them as is clear.a But the art of founding and expanding is the
same because he who expands wisely has to establish a foundation to which he
adds where he establishes a foothold.b
_______
a This sentence is unclear. They,
that is, the prince and the state, are preceded by them, that is, by foundation
and expansion.
b In ‘The Reason of State’ [RS]
1596 Botero added at the start “A state is a firm rule over people”. The
addition reads in Italian: “Stato e un dominio fermo sopra popoli”…In it there
seems to be an echo of the opening lines of ‘The Prince’: “Tutti li
stati, tutti e’ dominii che hanno avuto et hanno imperio sopra li uomini, sono
stati e sono o republiche o principate” [“All states, all domains that have had
and have dominion over men, have been and are either republics or
principalities”]. In RS 1596 he also reformulated and expanded the last
four lines thus: “The reason is that reason of state presupposes the prince and
the state (the former as the artificer, the latter as the material), which are
not presupposed at all by foundation and in part by expansion; rather they are
preceded by them. But the art of founding and expanding is the same because the
principles and the means are of the same nature. And even if all that which is
brought about by the above-mentioned causes is said to be brought about by
reason of state, nevertheless, this is said more of those things that cannot be
reduced to ordinary and common reason”. This final clause was probably also added
in response to critics who contended that this was the normal understanding of reason
of state. See, for example, Scipione Ammirato ‘Discorso sopra C. Tacito’
(1594).