After consulting Dale
Yoder’s article ‘Current Definitions of Revolution’[1], a note I would like to
anchor within this log is the extent to which Bodin’s conceptualisation of
revolution[2] is applicable to the
English School’s categorisation of ‘Revolutionism’ as a theoretical tradition
of international politics.
In the first instance,
Bodin makes a note that that at the heart of what he pens as ‘revolution’ is political
reversal. This such a view is shared, in some form, by a number of modern
thinkers from the thought of Hobbes in Behemoth, as a ‘six stage process
of usurpation’[3],
to the semantics of historical time that underline the historiography of
Reinhart Koselleck[4]
– as a ‘return’ that takes place down the path of time, manifesting as radical
change or adaptation; as in the use of the term revolution in reference to
vinyl records (revolutions per minute [RPM]). This does not necessarily
complicate the manner in which one should grasp the concept of ‘revolution’
behind revolutionism in the thought of The English School of International
Politics, whereby all revolutionism entails a certain sense of reactionary conservatism
on some level.
The second instance,
however, is less generous and perhaps more consequential for the study of
revolution within English school theory. Aside from the notion of political
reversal, Bodin contends that revolution is a purely political phenomenon
– referring to a markedly significant adaptation or shift in the location of
sovereignty. This is where the problem lies for the use of a Bodinian
conceptualisation of revolution in the international sphere. Due to the
distinct lack of overarching sovereignty within international society - the
very facet that makes it, in Hedley Bull’s own words, the anarchical
society – revolution simply cannot relate to a shift in the location of sovereignty,
as sovereignty on the level of the international must first be established for
such a revolution to take place. Perhaps, for the sake of ponderance, this
relates to the extent in which we may consider cosmopolitans like Kant as revolutionists
– precisely because their contribution to international theory is to argue in
favour of some mode of global sovereignty (be it in a universal, unitary, federal
or confederal manner)? Nonetheless, revolution may concern the location of
sovereignty in lieu of the very fact of an established sovereign entity over the
international sphere. As such, the use of Bodin’s conceptualisation can only be
partial.
[1] Dale Yoder (1926) ‘Current
Definitions of Revolution’, American Journal of Sociology, 32(3): 433-441.
[2] Jean Bodin, The Six Books of
The Commonwealth, pp. 406-7.
[3] See: Mark Hartman (1986) ‘Hobbes's
Concept of Political Revolution’, Journal of The History of Ideas, 47(3):
487-495.
[4] See: Reinhart Koselleck (2004) “Historical
Criteria of The Modern Concept of Revolution”, in Futures Past: On the
Semantics of Historical Time, New York: Columbia University Press, pp. 43-57.