For a few weeks now my
focus has shifted away from reading and writing about strict political theory,
and returned to my academic focus of International Theory – which does of
course go hand in hand with Political Theory (via the discipline of IPT) but
requires occasional breaks from theoretical discourse in order to read those works
concerning current international affairs. This is what has been occupying my
time in much of late January. So, what have I been reading about?
For many years now, I
have had an interest in the relationship between violent non-state global
actors that transcend, or rather operate without a second thought to, the
boundaries and borders of nation-states. Whilst studying for my undergraduate
degree (2013-2016), the Islamic State of Iraq and Syria [al-Sham] (ISIS)[1] established its quasi-totalitarian
Salafist rule over northern Iraq and Syria, whilst equally orchestrating a
number of attacks across the globe. ISIS is symptomatic of the foundational ambiguity
that our contemporary global politics has become defined by, operating in the
narrow yet deep crevasses between the political categories that we had become
accustomed to employing.
Take something as simple
as state sovereignty. State sovereignty can be understood, debated and
conceptualised in a myriad of ways. Nonetheless, Max Weber’s grasp of ‘The
State’ is still helpful, as a given territory in which a single faction holds a
monopoly of legitimate force and, with this, erects an administrative and
bureaucratic edifice. In the wake of: the 2003 Iraq war, the removal of Saddam
Hussein, the process of de-Baathification, the subsequent re-establishment of sectarian
divisions, the inability of Nouri al-Maliki’s government to provide public goods,
services and security for all, the region-wide effects of The Arab Spring, and
the Syrian Civil war, the fertile conditions were fostered to allow for the violent
seizure of territory by a vast array of jihadist militant groups.[2] Here, we saw both the
sovereign territories of Iraq and Syria undermined in border territories such
as Ninawa or Dayr Al-Zawr, where ISIS seized the monopoly of the legitimate use
of force and, subsequently, erected a state edifice that operated under strict Salafi-Wahhabist
Sharia law – where public administration and civic life were directed through literalist
interpretations of scripture with a reformist zealousness to return to seventh-century
Islamic life.[3]
Yet, amongst this, ISIS
equally operated as an international militia, drawing recruits, citizens and support
from across the globe - from those who often sought after social cohesion [asabiyyah].
Thus, whilst operating as a statist entity - performing and fulfilling the functions
of holding sovereignty over a territory – ISIS was also totally de-localised
and de-territorial – performing and operating as a global non-state entity or
militia. So, which was it? Which is it? A non-state entity that operates across
borders? Or an aspiring statist group that seeks to create borders? The answer
is both, and this is different practically and theoretically in
comparison to the structures, mechanics and operations of other revolutionary
actors in the past.
I suppose the question
is whether or not this status as an in-between, as operating permanently in the
realm of contingency, as neither grounded by nor disconnected from statist
norms, is epitomal of the wider cultural and social conflicts we have been
experiencing in the twenty-first century so far – i.e., the ‘glocalisation’ of
revolutionary politics; that is both characteristically fluid and rigid. This
permits us an insight into how globalisation has not only changed the manner in
which ‘high politics’ is conducted, but equally the manner in which revolutionary
groups function. ISIS is the first, but there may be more non-state/sovereign entities
like this in the future that make us question and reflect upon our own
analytical categories and concepts, reminding us of the contemporary
post-foundational character defining all of our politics.
[1] There is a lot of discussion
concerning how to name this political entity (E.g., ISIL, ISIS, IS, Islamic State,
DAESH, Da’esh, etc.). I have chosen ISIS for no particular reason beyond that
of habit, but I am aware of the problems with this terminology. For an
excellent discussion of this politico-linguistic problem, see: Graeme Wood
(2016) The Way of The Strangers: Encounters with Islamic State, London: Allen
Lane, pp. xi-xvi.
[2] Simon Mabon and Stephen Royle
(2017) The Origins of ISIS: The Collapse of Nations and Revolution in The
Middle East, London: I.B. Tauris & Co., Ltd., pp. 14-28.
[3] For a good description of the
administrative system that ISIS operated their territory under, see: Charles
Lister (2015) The Islamic State: A Brief Introduction, Washington, D.C.:
The Brookings Institution. For an excellent discussion of the manner in which ISIS contests sovereign territory in theoretical and practical terms, see: Mohamed-Ali Adraoui (2017) 'Borders and Sovereignty in Islamist and Jihadist Thought: Past and Present', International Affairs, 93 (4), pp. 917-935; Emil Archambault and Yannick Veilleux-Lepage (2020) 'Drone imagery in Islamic State propaganda: flying like a state', International Affairs, 96 (4), pp. 955–973.